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INTRODUCTION
Knowledge spaces have been a major tool for modeling interactive uncertainty in game theory and economics, ever since Aumann's seminal Ž . paper ''Agreeing to Disagree' ' Aumann, 1976 . Player's knowledge is modeled, in a knowledge space, by ascribing to him a partition of the space. At each element of the space, called a state, he knows those events Ž . i.e., subsets of the knowledge space which contain the partition member that includes the state. To describe what the players know about a game, we associate with each state a state of nature, which specifies the value of the objective parameters of the game, like the payoffs or signals. In this way, it is possible to describe what each player knows, in each state, regarding nature, and given these descriptions, what each player knows about the knowledge of the others regarding nature. Continuing inductively, one can describe the mutual knowledge of the players of all orders.
In applications, finite knowledge spaces are often used, in which clearly not every conceivable description of mutual knowledge is represented. It would, therefore, be nice to know that there is a uni¨ersal knowledge space, in which every state of mind of the players in whatever knowledge Ž . space with the same states of nature is represented. In other words, a universal space is one into which every knowledge space can be mapped by a knowledge morphismᎏa map that preserves both nature and the knowledge of the players. If such a big space exists, we could in principle always carry out the analysis in it, with no fear of neglecting any relevant state of affairs.
Ž . Type spaces, introduced by Harsanyi 1967᎐68 are another tool for the modeling of interactive uncertainty. Player's uncertainty in a state of such a space is represented by a -additive probability measure over the space Ž . rather than an element of his partition in a knowledge space .
In the following section we develop a general approach to the definition of type spaces, of which both knowledge spaces and Harsanyi type spaces are special cases. This enables us to consider a general notion of universal spaces, and rigorously pose the question of the existence of a universal space for both families of models in a unified manner.
The existence of a universal space for Harsanyi type spaces was first Ž . proved by Mertens and Zamir 1985 . They were followed by Branden-Ž . Ž . Ž . burger and Dekel 1993 , Heifetz 1993 , Mertens et al. 1994 , and Heifetz Ž . and Samet 1996 , who proved it for more diverse and general conditions.
In this work we show that there is no uni¨ersal space for knowledge spaces. For this purpose we define the rank of a knowledge space to be the ordinal length of the maximal non-trivial description of mutual knowledge in the space. We then show that a knowledge space cannot be mapped by a knowledge morphism to a knowledge space of lower rank. In order to prove that there is no universal knowledge space, one to which all knowledge spaces can be mapped, it is enough, then, to show that there are knowledge spaces with arbitrarily high ranks. We do this in Section 3, where we show by an explicit construction that even with two states of nature and two players there are knowledge spaces of any ordinal rank. This fact, with a somewhat different setup and terminology was proved Ž . independently, in a non-constructive way, by Fagin 1994 . Fagin et al. Ž . 1991 built a knowledge space with three players of order q 1.
The lack of a universal space for knowledge spaces, in contrast to the existence of such a space for Harsanyi type spaces, can be traced down to a single factor: continuity. In Harsanyi type spaces the beliefs of the players are -additive, and therefore continuous on increasing and decreasing sequences of events. As a result, describing the beliefs of a player regarding all the finite-order beliefs of the other players dictates also his beliefs regarding limit events that involve all these finite orders together. Indeed, Ž . Heifetz and Samet 1996 showed that type spaces of non-additive beliefs have universal spaces when the belief functions are continuous. In this they demonstrated that continuity is what guarantees the existence of a universal space.
Knowledge, by contrast, does not have this continuity property. More specifically, one can not-know any of the events in an increasing sequence Ž . of events that is, events that are less and less informative and yet know Ž . and thus fail not-to-know the limit of this sequence. Our construction shows that this lack of continuity holds for all limit ordinals. This means that there are arbitrarily long descriptions of mutual knowledge, which preclude the existence of a universal knowledge space.
KNOWLEDGE SPACES AND THEIR RANK

Knowledge Spaces
Throughout this section we fix non-empty sets I and S. The elements of I are the players and the elements of S are the states of nature. We think of each element of S as being the specification of the possible values of the parameters that are relevant to the interaction between the players, e.g., payoff functions or strategy sets.
A knowledge-space on S is given by a triplet, ² :
where ⍀ is a non-empty set whose elements are called states of the world and whose subsets are called e¨ents; ⌰: ⍀ ª S specifies for each state of the world the state of nature that prevails there; and for each player i g I, ⌸ is a partition on ⍀. 
These conditions guarantee that f preserves the structure of the spaces. Ž . By 2.1 , the same state of nature prevails in states that correspond by f.
Ž . By 2.2 the partition structure of the first space is mapped onto that of the second. The following proposition expresses the preservation of the knowl-Ž . edge structure of 2.2 in terms of knowledge operators. The simple proof is omitted. We denote by K X the knowledge operators of the space
Ž . PROPOSITION 2.1. The following condition is equi¨alent to 2.2 :
For each i g I and e¨ent E
Type Spaces Ž In order to see the analogy between knowledge spaces and probabilis-. tic belief spaces, we now present knowledge spaces as type spaces.
We start with some simple definitions. Let X and Y be sets and f â given function f : X ª Y. We use f to define a function f that maps real valued set functions on X to real valued set functions on Y. For each real
where ⍀ and ⌰ are defined as before, and for each i, t is a type function i from ⍀ to the set of real valued functions on events. We call the real Ž . valued function t the type of i at . We describe important events in i Ž ⍀ in terms of the type functions as follows see Monderer and Samet, . 1989 . For each real number p, event E in ⍀, and player i,
Knowledge spaces can be easily described as type spaces where the types are restricted to a certain kind of real valued functions: With each event Ž . P : ⍀ we associate a 0᎐1 real valued set function ␦ , where, ␦ E s 1 P P Ž . whenever P : E and ␦ E s 0 otherwise. 
Representing knowledge spaces as type spaces reveals the common features of knowledge spaces and probabilistic belief spaces. To demonstrate this point we describe briefly the class of probabilistic belief spaces on the space S of states of nature.
A probabilistic belief space, or belief space for short, is a type space where the spaces S and ⍀ are compact topological spaces. Events in a space are elements of the Borel -field generated by the topology of the Ž . space. For each i and , t is a -additive probability measure on the i Borel -field on ⍀. The functions ⌰ and t are required to be continuous i when the topology on the space of all probability measures on ⍀ is the topology of weak convergence. The continuity of t guarantees that the 
Uni¨ersal Type Spaces
The use of type spaces in economic or game-theoretic models raises the question of the limitations of such spaces. Fixing one type space usually leaves out types which are not accounted for in the space. It is possible, and usually is the case, that there is a richer type space into which the first can be mapped by a type morphism. The question, then, is whether every type space is restrictive in this sense, or there exists a ''biggest'' type space that includes all possible types. This would be a type space to which all Ž . other type spaces with the same space of nature states can be mapped by a type morphism. This question can be posed, in precisely the same terms, for every class of type spaces and in particular for knowledge spaces and belief spaces.
Ž . Mertens and Zamir 1985 answered this question in the affirmative for belief spaces. They proved the existence of a universal belief space ⍀*, characterized by the property that for each belief space ⍀ there is a unique belief morphism from ⍀ to ⍀*. To prove this theorem we employ the notion of the rank of a knowledge space.
The Rank of Knowledge Spaces
Knowledge spaces on S are designed for the purpose of expressing interactive knowledge concerning S. Thus, the events in ⍀ which are of interest are those that can be described in terms of states of nature and knowledge operators. The rank of a knowledge space is the ordinality of the non-trivial longest descriptions of such an event in the space.
To define rank formally, we use the following notation and terminology. For a partition P we denote by P the set of all arbitrary unions of elements of P. We say that the partition P is generated by a subset F F of ⍀ 2 , if P is the coarsest partition such that P contains F F. Alternatively, P is the partition of ⍀ to equivalence classes, where two states in ⍀ are equivalent if they belong to the same sets in F F.
We associate with a given knowledge space ⍀ a partition P ␣ of ⍀, for ␣ each ordinal ␣. The elements of P are called ␣-order e¨ents. We start with the partition of ⍀ which is defined in terms of states of nature. Then each partition P ␣ refines the previously defined partitions by adding to them events obtained by applying knowledge operators to previously defined events. Formally, the partitions P ␣ are defined as follows. P 0 is y1 Ž .
␣ the partition of ⍀ to the sets ⌰ s for s g S. The partition P is generated by the sets of the previously defined partitions and by events expressing knowledge of lower order events. Namely, P ␣ is generated by ␤ ␤ Ž . the sets in D P and the sets of the form K E , where E g D P ,
i.e., E is a ␤-order event for some ␤ -␣. Clearly, for ␣ -␤, 1 Ž . Their result is even more general and allows for some kind of preferences over acts from which beliefs cannot be explicitly isolated. Proof. Let f be the knowledge morphism from ⍀ to ⍀Ј, and denote by P ␣ and PЈ ␣ the partitions associated with ⍀ and ⍀Ј, respectively. Denote by K and K X the respective knowledge operators. We show that, for
Therefore, if PЈ s PЈ then P s P , which proves the proposition.
Ž . y1 Ž y1 Ž .. y1 Ž . We proceed by induction on ␣. By 2.1 , f ⌰Ј s s ⌰ s for Ž . each s g S, and therefore 2.5 holds for ␣ s 0. Suppose it holds for all ␤ -␣. We show that f y1 maps the set of generators of PЈ ␣ onto the set ␣ Ž . of generators of P , which proves 2.5 . By the induction hypothesis, Proposition 2.4 and Theorem 2.5 are used now to prove Theorem 2.3. < < < < Proof of Theorem 2.3. If I G 2 and S G 2 then, by Proposition 2.5, for any state space ⍀* on S there is a space ⍀ on S with rank higher than that of ⍀*. By Proposition 2.4, there is no knowledge morphism from ⍀ to ⍀*.
Q.E.D.
A CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE SPACES WITH ARBITRARY RANK
We prove Theorem 2.5 by constructing the spaces W ␣ . The construction is carried out for two states of nature and two players, but can be easily extended to more states of nature and more players; extra states are simply ignored and extra players are assigned trivial partitions. This construction Ž . constitutes a positive reply to a question that Fagin 1994 posed as an open problem.
The set of states of nature, in our construction, consists of the two Ä 4 results of tossing a coin, H and T. The set of players is I s 1, 2 , where we adopt the notational convention that j is the opponent of player i. We construct for every ordinal ␣ a knowledge space
For the construction of W ␣ we need the following definition. A con-Ž . sciousness record of length ␣ or a record of length ␣, for short is a Ž ␤ . sequence r s r such that: The formal description of the players' partitions, which we give later, is motivated by the following ''story.'' The letters S and D stand for ''sober'' and ''drunk.'' The players are hopelessly addicted to alcohol. No matter how much they try to avoid it, they finally fail and give up as embodied by Ž . means that the player knows the record of the other player at 0. That is, he can tell whether his opponent is sober or drunk at 0. Thus, i can tell whether j knows the state of nature or not. This makes sense even if he himself cannot tell the true state of nature, in case he is drunk at 0. Similar Ž meaning is given to sobriety in all non-limit ordinals which are the . The meaning of sobriety for limit ordinals must be different, as such ordinals do not have immediate predecessor. To explain the meaning of being sober at limit ordinals we introduce the following definition.
Ž . By condition 3.2 in the definition of a record, for each record r and a limit ordinal there exists a minimal ordinal, smaller than , from which Ž . on the elements of r are constantly D up to not including . We denote Ž .
2
Ž . this ordinal by m r . The -parity of the record r is the parity of m r .
Being sober at a limit ordinal means that the player knows the -parity of his opponent's record. The crucial point is that i's record up to Ž . not including the limit ordinal never enables him to perceive whether the other player is -even or -odd. This is so because i is always drunk Ž . from m w on, and therefore he cannot exclude the possibility that the i Ž other player stood the temptation longer than he did, and fell drunk up to . Ž . only at some later ordinal ␥ ) m w , where ␥ may be even as well as i odd. Therefore, becoming sober again in ordinal enables the player to exclude some records of the other player that he cannot exclude when he is drunk there. The state of consciousness of the players at limit ordinals determines, therefore, if they can resolve this uncertainty concerning previous ordinals. The state of consciousness in becomes itself the subject for uncertainty in later stages and so on.
To complete the informal description of players' information in W ␣ we add that each player always knows his own record. Ž .
iii for all ordinals ␤ such that ␤ q 1 -␣ :
w s S « w and w have the same -parity .
It is easy to verify that the sets ⌸ w form a partition of W , and that i Ž . ⌸ w is indeed the element of that partition that contains w. i We show in the following theorem that the intuitive explanation we gave to sobriety and drunkness holds formally, in terms of the knowledge operators K that are induced by the partitions. In W ␣ , for each player i g I,
To prove Theorem 3.1 we use Lemma 3.2 below. We first introduce Ä 4 some notation. -␤ ␤-initial segment of w , i.e., the sequence w , and by w the triplet Hart et al. 1996 the ''Knowing Whether'' operator J on events E in a partition space Ž . Ž . Ž c . is defined by J E s K E j K E . Thus, Theorem 3.2 asserts that being Sober at a given Ž stage means to know whether an appropriate event takes place. A variant of W for the first . infinite ordinal was the main tool in the above paper.
Ž . condition iv : If there is a limit ordinal ␥ --␣ in which player i is Ž . Ž sober in w i.e., w s S , and the -parity of the other player j in u i.e., i . the -parity of u is different than the -parity of w , then player i
By changing one coordinate in u we overcome this difficulty. Let be the minimal limit ordinal exceeding ␥. Choose an ordinal ␦ which satisfies
Ž .
i j such that the parity of ␦ q 1 is the same as the -parity of w . Define 
Ž . The proof of the inclusion from right to left in 3.5 is similar. Suppose w f S i . Choose ␤ -that has the same parity as the -parity of w and j such that By the induction hypothesis it follows that P ␥q1 separates the coordinates of levels smaller than ␥ q 1. It remains to prove the converse, Ž . namely, that if¨, w g W have the same ␥ q 1 -initial segment, i.e., Ž .
then¨and w are not separated by P ␥q1 . For this we have to show that events obtained by applying knowledge operators to ␥-order events, do not separate¨and w. Let G be a ␥-order Ž .
Ž . event and suppose that w g K G . We need to show that¨g K G .
